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Abstract 
 
This paper examines Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act entitled the “Wall 
Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010” (the “Act”).  The Act provides a comprehensive regulatory framework for 
swap transactions that designates the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as the primary regulators of the OTC derivatives swap market.  The Act provides a very broad definition of 
swaps to include most OTC derivatives transactions, and it grants the CFTC regulatory jurisdiction over them with the exception 
of security-based swaps to which the SEC is granted regulatory jurisdiction.  The hallmark of the legislation is the clearing, trade 
execution, and reporting requirements for OTC derivatives contracts modeled after similar regulatory requirements for securities 
and commodities to protect against systemic loss.  Effectively, standardized OTC derivatives swaps contracts will be the only 
swap transactions subject to the clearing and trade execution requirements.  The potential downside of the regulation is that 
customized contracts are not subject to clearing in light of the individualized nature of the terms of such contracts.  Thus, traders 
of customized contracts are subject to certain margin and capital requirements along with reporting requirements to protect 
against systemic loss in trading customized contracts.  The question is whether the alternative regulatory system for customized 
contracts can prevent against systemic loss in a manner comparable to the protections that the clearing, payment, settlement, 
and trade execution systems bring to trading in standardized contracts.  Moreover, will the bifurcated regulatory system for 
swap transactions incentivize traders to customize contracts to avoid the clearing and to avoid the transparency associated with 
exchange trading? The Act grants broad authority to the CFTC and the SEC to promulgate rules and provide interpretative 
guidelines to implement the regulatory provisions of the Act.  Ultimately, the effectiveness of the Act to prevent systemic loss 
and to protect the financial system against the type of market crisis experienced in 2008 will depend on the breadth and depth 
of the rules the agencies promulgate and the diligence with which they oversee and enforce those rules.   
 
I. Introduction  
In July 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act) which among other things, provides a regulatory framework for 
the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives swaps market.1   The stated purpose of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform Act is to “promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability 
and transparency in the financial system . . . to protect American taxpayers by ending bailouts, to 
                                                          
1
  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010).  
 
3 
 
protect consumers from abusive financial services providers, and for other purposes.2  The legislation 
was prompted by numerous calls for more stringent regulation of the financial markets after the 2008 
market crisis, which resulted in a $700 billion bailout package to numerous investment and commercial 
entities funded by the American taxpayer. 3    Most notably, the voluminous trades in credit default 
swaps, a form of OTC credit derivatives utilized by financial institutions as insurance against defaults on 
mortgage securities collateralized by subprime mortgages, have been viewed by many as instrumental in 
precipitating the systemic market failure that created negative externalities in the form of constricted 
credit and massive taxpayer bailouts. 4   
                                                          
2
  Id. 
 
3
  John Maggs, A Primer of Financial Reform, Nat’l Law J. Magazine, Nov. 21, 2009, 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/ad 200911218350.php; Barney Frank, A Comprehensive Solution to 
Combustible Markets, The Boston Globe, Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial 
opinion/opinion/oped/articles/2009/11/11.   
 
4
  Mooray Choudry, In Introduction to Credit Derivatives 11 (2004).  A credit default is a type of OTC credit 
derivative that parties use to hedge against loss related to credit obligations such as loans or bonds. Id. The most 
common form of a credit default swap is “vanilla” credit default swap, which allows a party holding a credit 
obligation referred to as the “protection buyer” to purchase a credit default swap to shift the risk associated with 
the credit obligation to a “protection seller,” a party willing to assume the risk of loss.  
 
4 
 
  Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, OTC swap trades were largely 
exempt from state and federal regulation in accordance with the Commodities Futures Modernization 
Act of 2000 (CFMA). 5   In 2000, Congress’ enacted the CFMA to exempt such trades to prevent the 
migration of OTC derivatives business to foreign markets with less regulation with the possible result 
that the U.S. would lose its competitive position. 6   Yet, the absence of comprehensive regulation for 
the OTC derivatives market resulted in market participants making huge, inefficient trades in opaque 
markets without sufficient capitalization.    
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act repeals the CFMA exemption setting forth a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for OTC derivatives swaps trades. 7  The hallmark of the Act is the 
clearing, exchange trading, and real-time data reporting requirements for OTC derivatives swap 
contracts.  This aspect of the regulation mimics the regulation of the securities and commodities 
markets.   Particularly, the clearing, payment, settlement, and trade execution components of the 
                                                          
5
   Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.§2 (2009)     
 
6
  Id.     
 
7
  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 
5 
 
securities and futures market have created well-functioning, transparent and disciplined markets.   The 
expectation is that the same results will be achieved in OTC derivatives swap market with the adoption 
of similar regulation.  
The results may differ however in the OTC derivatives market since the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform Act does not impose clearing and exchange trading requirements on all OTC derivatives swap 
transactions.  Unlike securities and commodities, not all OTC derivatives swap contracts are fungible or 
standardized.    The fungible nature of securities and commodities renders them all suitable to clearing. 
OTC derivatives contracts vary however from those with strictly standardized terms to those with highly 
specialized terms.   
Standardized OTC derivative swap contracts can clear with relative ease because they are 
fungible in nature. 8  Recently, Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), stated that “*o+ne of the primary goals of the Dodd-Frank Act was to lower [systemic] risk by 
requiring that standardized swaps to be centrally cleared.” 9 In fact, Congress, relying on the U.S. 
                                                          
8
  International Money Fund, Sovereigns, Funding, and Systemic Liquidity:  Global Financial Stability Report 
10 (2010) [hereinafter IMF Report]. 
 
9
  Process for Review of Swaps for Mandatory Clearing, 75 Federal Register 211 (proposed Nov. 2, 2010) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39 and 140). 
6 
 
Treasury estimates, enacted the clearing requirements with the understanding that “plain vanilla, 
standardized, high volume contracts – which according to the Treasury Department are about 90 
percent of the $600 trillion swaps market –will be subject to mandatory clearing.”10  Plain vanilla swap 
contracts contain standardized terms which clearinghouses can clear with relative ease through 
multilateral netting of exposures.   Interest rate swaps, credit default swaps based on indices, and more 
recently single name credit default swaps are sufficiently standardized for clearing purposes; and 
currently, a significant number of these swaps clear through clearinghouses.11 
Contracts with truly specialized or individualized terms, referred to as “customized contracts,” 
are less suitable for clearing.12  These contracts are privately negotiated and their popularity among 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
10
  Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. S5921.  Senator Lincoln indicates that 1200 standardized swaps and security-
based swaps are already clearing through clearinghouses registered with the CFTC and the SEC. Id.  
 
11
  IMF Report, supra note  at 10.   In 2009, forty-five percent of “OTC interest rate derivatives were centrally 
cleared by U.K.-based LCH.Clearnet, *while+ almost all other OTC derivatives were bilaterally cleared.”  Id. at 10; 
see also PRNewswire, Ice Trust Successfully Launchers Customer Solution for CDS Clearing: Over $4.3 Trillion in CDS 
Cleared to Date Globally, December 14, 2009.  
 
12
  Testimony of Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Before the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, June 4, 2009 [hereinafter, Gensler Testimony]   
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businesses stems from the ability to use such contracts to manage specific risk within their financial 
portfolio.13   In the year 2009, it was reported that “more than 90% of Fortune 500 companies” used 
customized contracts on a daily basis, and that legislation requiring the standardization of all OTC 
derivatives contracts could limit the ability of companies to manage their risk.14  To the extent that at 
least one of the counterparties to a customized contract is a non-financial entity utilizing OTC derivatives 
swap contracts for mitigating or hedging risks, the contract is exempted from clearing. 15  But for those 
counterparties whose customized swap contracts do not qualify for an exemption, clearing such 
contracts would require “specialized pricing and risk models and one-off infrastructure solutions” 
rendering the process more difficult and costly. 16  This is particularly a problem with customized OTC 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
13
  Point of View, OTC Derivatives:  Should all Customized derivatives be standardized? Price Waterhouse July 
2000, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/point-of-view/OTC-derivatives.jhtml hereinafter Point of View); see also 
Antonio N. Bomfim, Understanding Credit Derivatives and Related Instruments 29-31 (2002). 
  
14
  Id.  
 
15
  Dodd Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1678 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 and 15 U.S.C.A 
§ 78c-3).  The Act allows that counterparty utilize a clearing agency if it so chooses. Id.  
 
16
  IMF Report, supra at   10. 
8 
 
credit default swaps contracts which “have historically been nonfungible along business, legal, and 
operational dimensions.”17  
 To account for the varying nature of OTC derivatives swap contracts, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform Act creates a bifurcated regulatory system that effectively subjects counterparties with 
standardized contracts for which a liquid market exists to clearing requirements, while subjecting 
counterparties that trade customized OTC derivatives swap contracts to certain capital and margin 
requirements and reporting requirements.  The alternative regulatory system for customized contracts 
presumably was designed with the expectation that the capital and margin requirements and the 
reporting requirements would suffice to manage the systemic as well as counterparty risk that has 
historically threatened the integrity and stability of the OTC derivatives market.   Certainly, real-time 
data reporting, capital, and margin requirements for non-cleared swaps will provide greater protection 
against systemic loss and greater transparency than customized contracts have experienced historically.    
The question is whether the alternative regulatory system for customized contracts can prevent 
against systemic loss in a manner comparable to the protections that the clearing, payment, settlement, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
17
  Id.  
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and trade execution systems bring to trading in standardized contracts. 18   Moreover, will the bifurcated 
regulatory system for OTC derivatives swap contracts incentivize market participants to customize their 
contracts to avoid the clearing requirements to which standardized trades are subject and to avoid the 
added transparency of exchange trading to which most cleared trades will be subject?  
If the volume of customized contracts increases in response to the bifurcated regulatory system, 
the CFTC and SEC (collectively “the regulators”), which Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act has 
designated to regulate OTC derivatives swaps, will be called on increasingly to examine each swap, 
category of swap, and group of swap to determine if they pose systemic risk.  In addition, the regulators 
will have to implement necessary safeguards to protect the financial system from the systemic and 
counterparty risks such swap contracts may pose.  This places tremendous responsibility on financial 
regulators that were previously viewed by many as very slow to respond to the market crisis the country 
experienced in 2008.  It remains to be seen if they can fulfill these added responsibilities in a manner 
that will ensure the safety and soundness of our financial system.  Ultimately, the effectiveness of the 
bifurcated regulatory system will depend on the teeth of the rules the regulators promulgate under the 
                                                          
18
  IMF Report, supra  note at 2 (noting that during the 2008 market crisis OTC derivatives contracts that 
cleared through central counterparties (CCP) or clearing agencies functioned relatively well, while those contracts 
for which “CCPs were not involved, there were difficulties in unwinding derivatives contracts.”). 
10 
 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and the diligence with which they oversee the market and enforce 
the rules promulgated.  
This Paper examines the regulatory framework established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform Act and discusses the impact of that framework on the OTC derivatives swap market.  Part II 
provides a general discussion of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act entitled the “Wall 
Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010,” which contains the regulatory framework for OTC 
derivatives swap market.  Part III discusses the clearing requirements and policy considerations 
underlying the requirements along with the procedures that regulators must undertake to determine 
which swaps should be subject to clearing.  It also examines a recent mandatory clearing rule proposed 
by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.  Part IV is the Conclusion to the Paper.  
 
II. The Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 
 
 A. Introduction 
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act entitled The Wall Transparency and 
Accountability Act of 2010 (the “Act”) provides the regulatory framework for the OTC derivatives swap 
11 
 
market. 19   Rather than creating a new agency to regulate OTC derivatives, the Act allocates the 
jurisdiction of OTC derivatives swaps between the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) (collectively referred to as the “regulators”) with the 
exception of identified banking products, which are within the regulatory jurisdiction of prudential 
banking regulators. 20  Congress chose primarily to allocate jurisdiction between the two agencies 
following the principles of the Shad Johnson Accord21 implemented in 1982 to resolve jurisdictional 
                                                          
19
  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1641 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.A § 8301). 
 
 
20
  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1672 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 2). A prudential regulator means federal 
banking regulators including the Board, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of Comptroller, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Farm Credit Administration, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Dodd-Frank Act, 
124 Stat at 1665 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A 1a).  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act defined an identified banking 
product to include “any swap, including credit and equity swaps” except equity swaps sold to a person other than 
a qualified investor. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c note (2004).  Such products are exempt from the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the SEC or CFTC unless the appropriate Federal banking agency that regulates them 
excepts them from its jurisdiction after consulting with the CFTC and SEC and determining that the product  
“would meet the definition of a swap or security-based swap” and that it “has become known to trade as a swap 
or security-based swap, or otherwise has been structured as an identified banking product for the purpose of 
evading” the federal commodities or securities laws. Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1694 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A 
§ 27a).   
 
21
  Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2a (1999).  
12 
 
battles between the SEC and CFTC concerning financial products possessing both commodities’ and 
securities’ characteristics.22    
B. Regulatory Jurisdiction of Swap Transactions  
The Act grants exclusive jurisdiction of swaps 23 to the CFTC with the exception of those swaps 
that are “security-based” over which the SEC has jurisdiction.24   Security-based swaps are defined to 
include all swaps based on single name securities and narrow-based securities indices.25   Swaps based 
on broad-based securities indices are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC.26  Allocating the 
                                                          
 
22
  Dodd Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1672 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 2a).  See Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. 
S5920; see also CCH Attorney Editor Staff, Securities and Derivatives Reform in 2010:  A Guide to the Legislation 
212 (2010). 
23
  The Dodd-Frank Act provides an extensive definition of swaps to include certain types of puts, calls, caps, 
floors, or similar options as wells as swap agreements including, among other transactions,  
an interest rate swap, a rate floor, a rate cap, a currency swap, a basis swap, an equity swap, a debt swap, a credit 
spread, a credit default swap, a weather swap, a commodity swap. See Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1666-67 (to be 
codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a).   
 
24
  Dodd Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1672 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 2); see also Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. 
S5920.   
 
25
  See id. at 1756 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.A § 78(c)  
 
26
   
13 
 
CFTC regulatory jurisdiction over such swaps is consistent with Shad Johnson Accord, which granted the 
CFTC jurisdiction over futures and options products based on broad-based securities indices.27   
The CFTC also has exclusive jurisdiction over security-based swap agreements, which are 
different from “security-based” swaps.28   Security-based swap agreements include any swap agreement 
as defined by Section 206A of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act in “which a material term is based on the 
price, yield, value, or volatility of any security or any group or index of securities, or any interest 
therein.”29  Senator Blanche Lincoln referred to the term “security-based swap agreement” as a hold-
over from the CFMA, which excluded such agreements from regulation.30   The one exception to the 
regulatory exclusion was that such “security-based swap agreements” were subject to the anti-fraud 
                                                          
 
27
  Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. S5920. 
 
28
  Dodd Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1667 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 1a) (defining a swap to include ‘security-
based swap agreements’). 
 
29
  Id. 
 
30
  Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. 5920, 5921.   
 
14 
 
provisions of the federal securities laws. 31   At that time, the SEC was granted regulatory jurisdiction 
over “security-based swap agreements” because it, unlike the CFTC, had extensive anti-fraud and anti-
manipulation provisions.32   
With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, “security-based swap agreements” 
are considered swaps rather than security-based swaps, thus rendering them subject to the jurisdiction 
of the CFTC.33  To ensure that such agreements remain subject to anti-fraud and anti-manipulation laws, 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act amends the anti-manipulation provisions of the commodities 
laws.  The Act mandates that the CFTC promulgate anti-fraud and anti-manipulation rules comparable to 
the securities laws under which “security-based swap agreements” were subject prior to the passage of 
the Act. 34  Senator Lincoln suggests that swaps qualifying as “security-based swap agreements” under 
the Dodd-Frank Act are limited to swaps based on broad-based indices and credit default swaps.35  
                                                          
31
   Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j (2006).  
 
32
   Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. S5921 
 
33
  See Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1667 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c Note) (repealing the prohibition 
of regulation of security-based swap agreements); see also id. at 1759 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.A. 78c) (noting 
that the “term ‘security-based swap agreement’ does not include any security-based swap.”).   
34
  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat.      (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §   ); see also Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. S5921. 
15 
 
Hybrid swaps that possess characteristics of both commodities and securities are classified as 
“mixed swaps.”36    The Act indicates that mixed swaps are security-based swaps, but requires that the 
CFTC and SEC engage in joint rulemaking concerning such products. 37  Senator Lincoln posited however 
that the regulators promulgate rules jointly in a manner that ensures that the jurisdictional authority 
over such products will be determined based on whether their predominant characteristics are 
commodity or security-based.38  She indicated that the determination should be “based on clear and 
unambiguous criteria like a primarily test.” 39    
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
35
  Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. S5920-21. 
 
36
  Dodd Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1668 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 1a). 
 
37
  Dodd Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1668, 1756 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 1a and 15 U.S.C.A 78c). 
 
 
38
  Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. S5920-21.  
 
39
  Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. S5921.  Senator Lincoln stated that “*a+ de minimis amount of security-based 
swap attributes should not bring a swap into the SEC’s jurisdiction just as a de minimis of amount of swap 
attributes should not bring a security-based swap into the CFTC’s jurisdiction. Id.  
16 
 
With respect to the swaps and security-based swaps generally, each regulator has exclusive 
authority to promulgate rules and issue orders for swaps within its regulatory jurisdiction.40  The 
regulators must consult however with each other and with prudential regulators before promulgating 
rules and issuing orders to ensure “regulatory consistency and comparability, to the extent possible.”41 
Consistent and comparable rules across the swap and security-based swap markets dissuade traders 
from engaging in regulatory arbitrage.  
For the most part, the regulatory framework for OTC derivatives swaps consists of amendments 
to the federal commodities and securities laws in a fashion that imposes regulatory provisions on swap 
market participants similar to those imposed on participants in the securities and commodities 
markets.42  The amendments establish entities such as derivatives clearing organizations43 swap data 
                                                          
40
  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1641 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 8302). 
 
41
  Id. 
 
42
  Testimony of Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Before the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, June 4, 2009. Chairman Gensler testified that subjecting all 
derivatives dealers to capital and margin requirements would “help prevent the types of systemic risks that AIG 
created.”  Id. [hereinafter, Gensler Testimony] 
 
17 
 
repositories44 and security-based swap data repositories,45 and swap execution facilities46and security-
based swap execution facilities47 to create a more transparent market with disciplined trading and well 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
43
  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1685, 1768 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A 7a-1 and 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c). 
 
44
  A swap data repository “means any person that collects and maintains information or records with 
respect to transactions or positions in, or the terms and conditions of, swaps entered into by third parties for the 
purpose of providing a centralized recordkeeping facility for swaps.” Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1669-70 (to be 
codified at 7 U.S.C.A 1a).  
 
45
  A security-based swap data repository “means any person that collects and maintains information or 
records with respect to transactions or positions in or the terms and conditions of, security-based swaps entered 
into by third parties for the purpose of providing a centralized recordkeeping facility for security-based swaps.” 
Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1758 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.A 78c).  
 
46
   A swap execution facility “means a trading system or platform in which multiple participants have the 
ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple participants in the facility or 
system, through any means of interstate commerce, including any trading facility, that (A) facilitates the execution 
of swaps between persons; and (B) is not a designated contract market.” Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1670 (to be 
codified at 7 U.S.C.A 1a).  
 
47
  A security-based swap execution facility “means a trading system or platform in which multiple 
participants have the ability to execute or trade security-based swaps by accepting bids and offers made by 
multiple participants in the facility or system, through any means of interstate commerce, including any trading 
facility, that (A) facilitates the execution of security-based swaps between persons; and (B) is not a national 
securities exchange.”  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1758-59 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.A 78c).  
18 
 
functioning clearing, payment, and settlement systems.  Moreover, swap dealers48and security-based 
swap dealers49 as well as major swap participants50 and security-based swap participants51 are subject to 
certain registration,52 reporting and record keeping requirements. 53  Overall, the amendments 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
48
  A swap dealer includes “any person who: (1) holds itself out as a dealer in swaps; (ii) makes a market in 
swaps; and (iii) regularly enters into swaps with counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its own 
account . . . . “  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1669 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 1a). 
 
49
  A security-based swap dealer includes “any person who:  (ii) holds himself out as a dealer in security-
based swaps; (ii) makes a market in security-based swaps; (iii) regularly enters into security-based swaps with 
counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its own account . . . .” Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1756 (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c). 
 
50
   A major swap participant “means any person who is not a swap dealer, and (i) maintains a substantial 
position in swaps for any of the major swap categories as determined by the [Commodities Futures] Commission 
excluding (I) positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk . . . . “Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1663 (to be 
codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 1a). 
 
51
  A major security based major swap participant includes “any person:  (i) who is not a security-based swap 
dealer; and (ii) who maintains a substantial position in security-based swaps for any of the major security-baased 
categories, as such categories are determined by the Commission, excluding both positions held for hedging or 
mitigating commercial risk . . . .” Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1755 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c). 
 
52
  Dodd-Frank Act , 124 Stat. at 1703-04, 1784-85  (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 6s and 15 U.S.C.A. 78o-8) 
19 
 
implement a regulatory framework designed to protect against systemic failure that could cripple the 
financial system.   
II. Clearing and Trade Execution Requirements 
 A. Introduction  
At the heart of the regulation is the clearing requirement for swaps and security-based swaps. 54  
Clearing is essential to achieving the type efficiency, integrity, and discipline in the market necessary to 
prevent systemic risk and to manage counterparty and operational risk.  Derivatives clearing 
organizations can insulate counterparties to swaps transactions from each others’ default by interposing 
themselves between the counterparties serving as a buyer to the seller and a seller to the buyer of a 
swap contract.55  Clearinghouses can match and verify the terms and conditions of a swap contract and 
“transfer funds and ownership of instruments per the terms and conditions of a swap trade.”56  Serving 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
53
   Id. 
54
  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1676, 1768 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 and 15 U.S.C.A 78q-1).  
 
55
  IMF Report, supra note at 3. 
 
56
  IMF Report, supra note at 2. 
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in that capacity, they can reduce systemic risk by “multilateral netting of exposures, the enforcement of 
robust risk management standards, and the mutualization of losses resulting from clearing member 
failures. 57 The exchange trading requirement complements the clearing requirement by providing 
transparency and greater price discovery to swap transactions which historically have traded in opaque 
markets incentivizing dealers to charge supra-competitive prices.   
B. Clearing and Trade Execution Mandates  
The Act makes it unlawful to trade in swaps or security-based swaps without clearing such 
transactions through a derivatives clearing organization unless the swap transaction is exempted from 
clearing.58  Those counterparties subject to clearing requirements must execute their swap transaction 
either “on a board of trade designated as a contract market” or a “swap execution facility.”59  Similarly, 
                                                          
57
  Id. 
 
58
   Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1676, 1762 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 and 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-3).  The 
clearing requirements do not apply to swaps and security-based swaps if at least one counterparty to the 
transaction is “(i) is not a financial entity; (ii) is using swaps to hedge or to mitigate commercial risk; and (iii) 
notifies [the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodities Futures] Commission . . . . how it generally 
meets its financial obligations associated with entering into non-cleared swaps.” Id.   
 
59
  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1681 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2) 
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counterparties to security-based swap contracts must execute their transactions either on an exchange 
or security-based swap facility. 60  The exchange trading requirements is not applicable if no exchange or 
trade execution facility will accept the swap transaction.61   One reason for creating the exception was to 
exempt swap transactions for which a liquid market does not exist.62   
Derivatives clearing organizations are required to submit to the appropriate regulator any swap 
that they accept for clearing to obtain approval to clear the swap.63  Regulators must review the swaps 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
60
  Id.  at 1767 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-3). 
61
  Id. at 1681, 1767 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 2 and 15 U.S.C.A § 78c-3).  A swap or security-based swap is 
exempt from trading on a trade execution facility if the financial product is exempt from clearing. Id. 
 
62
  Cong. Rec., July 10, 2010, p. S5923.  Congress provided the exception because it wanted the regulators to 
“take a practical approach rather than formal or legalistic approach” in determining whether a swap or security-
based swap trade on a board of trade, an exchange, or swap execution facility. Id.  In determining whether it is 
practical for the swap transaction to trade on a board of trade, an exchange, or swap execution facility, Congress 
wanted the regulators to consider “whether there was a minimum amount of liquidity such that the swap can 
actually be traded on the facility.”Id. Congress indicated that “*t+he mere ‘listing’ of the swap by a swap execution 
facility, in and of itself, without a minimum amount of liquidity to make trading possible, should not be sufficient 
to trigger the Trade Execution Requirement.” Id.   
 
63
  Id. 
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submitted64 and to facilitate the review process, regulators must promulgate rules to create procedures 
for reviewing swaps submitted.65     The Act requires that the swap transactions submitted by derivatives 
clearing organizations be disclosed to the public to “provide at least a 30-day comment period regarding 
its determination” of whether the swap should be required to be cleared. 66  
In addition, regulators must initiate, on an ongoing basis, a review of “each swap, or any group, 
category, type, or class of swap” that was not submitted to derivatives clearing organizations to 
determine if they should be cleared.67   As part of their ongoing initiated review, regulators must also 
review swaps not accepted for clearing by derivatives clearing organizations to determine whether they 
                                                          
64
  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat at 1676, 1762 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 and 15 U.S.C.A. 78c-3)Id.  The 
Dodd-Frank provides “open access” provisions mandating that the rules of derivatives clearing organizations 
provide that swaps and security-based swaps with the “same terms and conditions are economically equivalent 
within the derivatives clearing organization and may be offset with each other within the derivatives clearing 
organization.” Id.    
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  Id. at 1677, 1763 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 and 15 U.S.C.A. 78c-3).    
 
66
   Id.   
 
67
  Id.  
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should be cleared. 68  After completing their initiated review, regulators must determine what actions 
should be taken to prevent systemic risk in trading swaps not accepted for clearing.69  These actions 
include mandating a derivatives clearing organization clear a swap if the regulator deems it should be 
subject to the clearing requirement. 70  The ongoing agency-review mandate was considered by senior 
members of the Senate Agriculture Committee as essential to prevent clearinghouses from blocking a 
mandatory clearing determination made by either the CFTC or SEC.71    
In determining whether to mandate clearing for swap transactions submitted by derivatives 
clearing organizations or to mandate clearing for those swaps subject to the regulators’ initiated-review 
process, the regulators are required to consider statutory factors contained within the Act.72  The 
                                                          
68
  Id.  See also Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. S5921. 
 
69
  See Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. S5921; see also CFTC Mandatory Clearing Proposed Rule, supra note   at 
67279 
 
70
  See Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010, p. S5921. 
 
71
  Id. 
72
  Dodd Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1677, 1763 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A § 2 and 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c-3).  The 
statutory factors include:  
(I) “The existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity, and adequate 
pricing data. 
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statutory factors were included to avoid conflicts of interest that may arise as the CFTC and SEC make 
clearing determinations for swaps transactions within their respective regulatory jurisdictions.73  In that 
respect, the statutory factors provide objective standards against which both regulators can determine 
whether swap transactions are required to be cleared.   Overall, the factors are directed toward 
ascertaining the liquidity and legal certainty of the swap contracts and the systemic risk posed by them.   
C. CFTC Mandatory Clearing Proposal   
Recently, the CFTC proposed rules for comment regarding mandatory clearing for swaps.74  The 
proposed rule sets forth procedures for reviewing swaps submitted by derivatives clearing organizations 
and for reviewing swaps identified by regulators as part of their initiated review process. 75  The rule 
proposes that derivatives clearing organizations submitting swaps for clearing provide the agency with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(II) The availability of rule framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources, and credit 
support infrastructure to clear the contract on terms that are consistent with the material terms 
and trading conventions on which the contract is traded. 
(III) The effect of the mitigation of systemic risk, taking into account the size of the market for such 
contract and the resources of the derivatives clearing organization available to clear the contract. 
(IV) The effect on competition, including appropriate fees and charges applied to clearing 
(V) The existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of the insolvency of the relevant 
derivatives clearing organization or 1 or more of its clearing members with regard to the 
treatment of customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property. Id. 
 
73
  Cong. Rec., July 15, 2010 p. S5921 
74
   See CFTC Mandatory Clearing Proposed Rules, supra note  at 67277. 
75
   Id. at 67278-79 
 
25 
 
information to assist it in its “quantitative and qualitative assessment of *the+ five specific *statutory+ 
factors that the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Commission to take into account when reviewing a swap 
submission.”76  If the agency determines that a swap submitted should be cleared, the CFTC will “impose 
*the+ terms and conditions” of the clearing as it deems appropriate.77  
The proposed rule indicates that the CFTC would initiate its own review for swap contracts that 
have not been accepted for clearing by a derivatives clearing organization.78  The rule proposes that the 
CFTC, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, would initiate an investigation of swap transactions that have 
not been accepted for clearing to determine “whether they should be required to be cleared.” 79   In 
undertaking its review, the agency will utilize information it receives “pursuant to Commission 
                                                          
76
  Id. at 67278.  Among other things, “*t+he proposed regulation would require the DCO *derivatives clearing 
organization] to provide specific information relating to product specifications; participant eligibility standards; 
pricing sources, models, and procedures; risk management procedures; measures of market liquidity and trading 
activity; the effect of a clearing requirement on the market for the swap; applicable rules, manuals, policies, or 
procedures; and terms and trading conventions on which the swap is currently traded.” Id. 
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   Id. at 67279. 
 
78
  Id. 
 
79
  Id. 
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regulations from swap data repositories, swap dealers, and major swap participants, and any other 
available information in undertaking” reviews of such swaps. 80  Once it completes its investigation, the 
CFTC would issue a report detailing the results of its investigation and take whatever actions “necessary 
and in the public interest” including imposing “margin or capital requirements” for the swap at issue.81   
Interestingly, the CFTC’s position in the proposed rule regarding non-cleared swaps is not 
completely consistent with the Act’s mandate for the imposition of margin and capital requirements for 
all non-cleared swaps.   The Act mandates that the regulators “shall adopt rules for swap dealers and 
major swap participants . . .  imposing (i) capital requirements; and (2) both initial and variation margin 
requirements on all (emphasis added) that are not cleared by a registered derivative clearing 
organization . . . to offset the greater risk to the swap dealer and major swap participant and the 
financial system arising from the use of swaps not cleared.” 82  The proposed CFTC rule suggests 
however that the CFTC can exercise its discretion in determining whether a swap dealer or major swap 
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  Id. 
 
81
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82
  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. 1705, and 1786 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A §6s and 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-8.)  
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participant whose swap is not accepted for clearing should be subject to capital or margin 
requirements.83   
The difference between the proposed rule and the Act could create uncertainty concerning the 
imposition of margin and capital requirements in non-cleared swap trades.  Ultimately, allowing 
regulators to make piecemeal determinations whether swap dealers or swap market participants trading 
in non-cleared swaps should be subject margin and capital requirements could result in insufficient 
protection against counterparty default.  Since the Act evidences Congress’ intent to apply margin and 
capital requirements to all non-cleared swaps to offset counterparty and systemic risk, the rules 
proposed by the regulators should reflect that intent.    
Moreover, the proposed rules could provide more guidance on how the agency intends to 
address swaps that it determines should not be cleared.  Presumably, a regulator could determine a 
swap, category of swap, or group of swaps should not be cleared because they are:  
(1)  Exempted from clearing pursuant to the Act;  
 
(2)  Ineligible for clearing because of: 
(a)  Their customized nature; 
(b)  Their lack of market liquidity; or   
(c) The under-capitalized nature of the derivatives clearing organization; or  
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  CFTC Mandatory Clearing Proposed Rule, supra note  at 67279. 
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(3) Restricted from trading altogether because the systemic risk they pose individually or in 
conjunction with outstanding swap trades far outweighs any financial or economic 
benefits that could be realized by the trade. 
 
   
Presumably, swaps satisfying Category 2a or 2b would not be suitable for clearing, thereby subjecting 
the swap trader to margin and capital requirements along with requiring traders to report certain 
information about such swap transactions to a swap depository.   Regulators could require that traders 
whose swap transactions satisfy Category 2c clear their swap transactions through a derivatives clearing 
organization with sufficient capital and resources to manage the systemic, counterparty, and 
operational risk associated with the trade.   Swaps satisfying Category 3 should not be allowed to trade.   
A. Prevention of Evasion of Clearing Requirements  
As part of the initiated review process, regulators should also assess swaps to determine 
whether traders have slightly altered standardized contracts to render them customized.  Last year, 
CFTC Chairman Gensler testifying before the Senate expressed concern that dealers and traders might 
try to evade the clearing requirements by changing “a few minor terms of a standardized swap to avoid 
clearing and the added transparency of exchanges and electronic trading systems.”84  To prevent 
                                                          
84
  Testimony of Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Before the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, June 4, 2009 [hereinafter, Gensler Testimony]  
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evasion of the clearing requirement, Chairman Gensler proposed a presumption that OTC derivatives 
contracts accepted by a clearinghouse must be cleared.85  The House bill86 included that presumption, 
but the Senate discussion draft87 did not.  The final version of the Act does not include such a 
presumption, but it does require the CFTC and the SEC to promulgate rules and issue interpretations of 
those rules as “necessary to prevent evasion of the mandatory clearing requirements.”88   
III. Conclusion  
Overall, the Act seeks to protect the financial system against the type of systemic risk that the 
country faced during the 2008 financial crisis by amending the federal commodities and securities laws.  
The amendments require that traders clear swaps if required to do so by regulators, and if accepted, 
execute trades for such swaps on the appropriate trading facility.   Congress enacted such regulation 
however cognizant that not all OTC derivatives swaps would be subject to it.   While clearing is 
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  Testimony of Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Before the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, June 4, 2009. 
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  The Wall Street Reform Act, H.R. 4173, 111
th
 Cong. § 3101 (2009 
87
  Staff of S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Report On Financial Reform Law (Comm. Print 
2010) 
 
88
  Frank-Dodd Act, 124 Stat. at 1677, 1764 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 and 15 U.S.C.A. 78c-3). 
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mandated for standardized contracts it remains to be seen whether the alternative mechanisms 
implemented by the Act for customized contracts – the posting of capital and margin requirements, the 
real-time price reporting requirements, and the establishment of swap repositories – can protect against 
the type systemic and counterparty losses that clearinghouses are designed to manage.  Ultimately, the 
effectiveness of the legislation will turn on the rulemaking, oversight, and enforcement efforts of the 
financial regulators to sustain a bifurcated system that provides two different regulatory approaches to 
protect against systemic loss.    
 
